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Better Procedures for Fairer Outcomes: 
Youth Quotas in Parliaments
by Juliana Bidadanure
bstract: In this article, I put forward
an instrumental justification for the
introduction of youth quotas in par-
liaments on grounds of justice between co-
 existing generations. I provide a two-fold
argument drawing on the distinction between
“substantive representation” and “symbolic rep-
resentation”. I argue that these jointly provide
a good basis for a “politics of youth presence” in
parliaments. In the first section, I evaluate the
impact that youth quotas can have on enhanc-
ing the chances of fair youth policies (substan-
tive representation). In the second section, I
show that youth quotas can play an important
symbolic role in the promotion of a community
of political equals, with potential implications
for youth political participation (symbolic rep-
resentation). 
Introduction
The question of the political representation
of young people in parliaments is particu-
larly relevant to the topic of intergenera-
tional justice. As the ratio of young to
elderly people decreases in most wealthy
countries, some are concerned that young
people may get sidelined, and that our
democracies may become gerontocracies.1 In
European countries, very few MPs are under
40 years old and close to none are under 30
years old. In this context, the option of in-
troducing youth quotas in parliaments
seems appealing. And yet, there is very little
research available on the topic and politi-
cians have not yet acknowledged it as a rel-
evant reform to consider. How should we
explain this lack of critical engagement with
a policy that seems fairly relevant at first
sight? Whether we believe in representation
as the ideal of democracy or as the second
best option after participatory democracy, it
seems that the possibility of implementing
quotas in order to prevent some social
groups from being marginalised or excluded
is now broadly acknowledged. Gender and
ethnic quotas are studied, deliberated, tested
or implemented. Why aren’t age quotas, in
general, and youth quotas, in particular,
being discussed, too? 
One response to this question is: “because
age is special.”2 If women and ethnic mi-
norities are not represented in parliaments,
they will have been treated unequally in
comparison with other citizens. On the con-
trary, if you adopt a diachronic perspective,
if young people are not represented, they
will not have been treated unequally over
their complete lives, when compared with
other age groups who were young them-
selves at some point. Inequalities between
age groups can be considered as prima facie
less problematic than inequalities between
other social groups. As Axel Gosseries puts
it, “a society that heavily discriminates be-
tween people on grounds of age can still
treat people equally, if we consider their ac-
cess to given resources over their complete
lives. Everyone’s turn will come.”3This speci-
ficity of age partly explains why the absence
of young people in parliaments is not seen as
an injustice like inequalities in representa-
tion between other social groups. As Anne
Philips argues in a brief paragraph on the
underrepresentation of young people in pol-
itics: “The situation of women looks more
obviously unfair [than that of young people]
in that women will be under-represented
throughout their entire lives.”4 
There is another relevant distinction to be
made between the justification of gender or
ethnic quotas and the discussion on the need
for youth quotas. If women are not repre-
sented in parliament, then it is likely to
mean that they do not stand a fair chance in
the competition for these social positions.
The history of gender domination and ex-
clusion substantiates the suspicion.5 Gender
and ethnicity are not relevant grounds for
exclusion from such positions. On grounds
of fair equality of opportunity therefore, and
against unfair discriminations, one may sup-
port the introduction of quotas in parlia-
ment for these groups to restore equality of
opportunity. However, this argument is un-
likely to work for young people. Indeed, the
main explanation and justification for the
absence of young people in parliament is
likely to be their lack of experience. Experi-
ence, unlike gender or ethnicity, is a relevant
feature of the position of being an MP. In
other words, it is not the case that the ex-
clusionary criterion in the case of young
people is irrelevant to the position of being
an MP. 
For these two reasons at least, it is likely that
the best defences of youth quotas will rely
on an instrumental justification. Rather than
arguing, as for gender, that the inequality in
representation is prima facie unfair, one may
want to insist on both the negative conse-
quences that the absence of young people in
parliaments causes and the positive out-
comes that introducing youth quotas could
bring about. This article provides this in-
strumental justification and claims that
youth quotas, insofar as they can indeed
help in bringing about intergenerationally
fairer outcomes, deserve to be seriously con-
sidered. I will thus not consider more direct
justifications for quotas so as to exclusively
focus on instrumental justifications. 
In the literature on quotas, two kinds of
grounds for quotas are often emphasised: on
the one hand, the policy level or “substantive
representation” and, on the other hand, the
symbolic level or “symbolic representation”.6
The first is about the impact that quotas can
have for the policies that will be discussed
and implemented. The second is about the
impact that the implementation of quotas
could have, beyond the parliamentary room,
for social cohesion. In this paper, I put for-
ward two instrumental arguments for the in-
troduction of youth quotas and argue that
they jointly provide a good basis for a “poli-
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vote, too. For instance, drawing on Andy
Furlong and Fred Cartmel’s research based
on the British Election Survey 2009/10, he
showed that “unemployment” was an issue
that concerned the members of Generation
Y (15−30 years old) substantially more than
members of the baby-boomers generation.
The topic of “health care” was seen as a pri-
ority over unemployment by both the baby-
boomers and the “silent generation”.14 One
simply needs to recognise that age groups,
because of their position in the lifespan and
their cohort membership, share a series of
common concerns, goals and experiences. I
will only appeal to this weak understanding
of youth interests in the remainder of this
section. 
Another important limitation of descriptive
representation as substantive representation
must be raised here. There is a fundamental
distinction to be made between the under-
representation of young people on the elec-
tors’ side, on the one hand, and on the
representatives’ side, on the other. The pos-
sible correlation between age, cohort, and
voting power does not seem to provide evi-
dent reasons to consider modifying the com-
position of representative bodies. All Van
Parijs, Longman and Berry seem to claim is
that there is a correlation between “voting”
and age. The problem would then be the
ageing of the electorate, not the age of par-
liamentarians per se. Young MPs may find
themselves victim of the problem of having
to meet the short-term interests of their elec-
torates too, just like older MPs. If anything,
population ageing may give us reasons to
consider a number of voting reforms, but
not directly to bring more young people into
parliaments. This is an important limitation
to establishing what quotas alone can do if
the young remain relatively disenfranchised.
The aim of this section is precisely to estab-
lish the special significance and hopes of de-
scriptive representation itself, in isolation
from what voting can do.
Preventing the exclusion of youth interests from
the party packaging of political ideas
Regardless of the party young MPs may be
from, they may contribute in expanding the
party policy package available through push-
ing for a better inclusion of youth concerns
in political agendas. Anne Philips identifies
such party packaging as a fundamental ar-
essential trait, or nature, that binds every
member of a descriptive group together, giv-
ing them common interests that, in the most
extreme versions of the idea, transcend the
interests that divide them.”9 In the case of
young people, we may too quickly assume
that they have common substantive inter-
ests. We may also presuppose that older MPs
cannot represent young people’s interests ad-
equately. We may disregard more important
differences, such as those stemming from
class membership. 
Appealing to such an overly essentialist un-
derstanding of the category of young people
in order to justify quotas is likely to be far-
fetched. The impact of age on political ideas
is not prevalent. In the UK, in the 2010
General Election, for instance, young peo-
ple voted equally for the three dominant
parties: 30% of young people between 18
and 24 years old voted for the Conservative
Party, 31% Labour and 30% Lib Dem.10,11
As attested by the solidarity demonstrations
in France in 2010, young people often sup-
port the pension claims of the elderly.12 Pro-
moting an essentialist conception of age
groups is also potentially counterproductive
because, given that society is ageing anyway,
the last thing we want is for institutions to
reinforce the view that one should only vote
for what is best for one’s own age group. This
would in fact ensure that institutions would
be age-biased because the majority age group
would be encouraged to shape institutions
in a way that meets their own temporal in-
terests as they age. 
However, one does not have to be in the
grips of an overly essentialist view of age to
make a successful argument for youth quo-
tas. One merely has to assume that there are
some age or cohort-related interests, concerns
or goals that have some impact on people’s
voting behaviours. Age seems to have at least
some impact on people’s views on which
policies should be implemented: “voting at
referenda on long-term ecological issues
such as whether or not a country should
abandon nuclear energy has been shown to
be strongly related to age.”13 For instance,
Van Parijs uses the example of a 1990 refer-
endum in Switzerland organised for a phase-
out on nuclear energy: 64% of the 18−29
age range and 57% of the 30−39s supported
the proposal, but it was rejected since only
47% of the overall population supported it
– the favorable votes of the youngest were
outweighed by the negative votes of older
voters. More recently, Craig Berry showed
that age has some impact on how people
Substantive representation: What can
youth quotas do for deliberations?
Jane Mansbridge argues that one key ground
for supporting the introduction of “descrip-
tive representatives” – that is, representatives
from selected marginalised groups – is that it
enhances “the substantive representation of
the group’s interests by improving the qual-
ity of deliberation.”7 In this section, I evalu-
ate the kind of impact the introduction of
youth quotas can have on parliamentary de-
liberations − that is, on the ideas discussed
and ultimately on the policies implemented.
I argue that a correlation between a youth
presence in parliament and fairer intergen-
erational outcomes is likely. 
In The Politics of Presence, Anne Philips puts
forward a justification for gender and ethnic
quotas based on “the need to tackle those ex-
clusions inherent in the party packaging of
political ideas, the need for more vigorous
advocacy on behalf of disadvantaged groups,
and the importance of a politics of transfor-
mation in opening up a fuller range of pol-
icy options.”8 My defence of youth quotas
formulates two arguments which draw on
Philips’ first two arguments. Mitigating the
underrepresentation of young people, I
argue, is desirable: to prevent the exclusion
of some age-related concerns from “the party
packaging of political ideas” – for instance
concerns related to affordable housing and
education, and unemployment; and to in-
crease the chance of “more vigorous advo-
cacy” on behalf of the young – for instance
through speaking out against misrepresenta-
tions of the young as lazy and self-deserving
(both will be discussed in the following sec-
tions). But I will briefly start with two im-
portant limitations of the substantive
argument for quotas.
Narrowing the scope of the substantive repre-
sentation argument
The idea of “substantive representation” pre-
supposes that there are such things as “group
interests”, such as “women interests”. In my
case, assessing the potential impact of youth
quotas on the substantive representation of
“youth interests” presupposes such a group-
based conception of interests. However, this
approach risks unduly essentialising groups:
“Essentialism involves assuming a single or
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The Youth of a Nation are the 
trustees of posterity. 
/ Benjamin Disraeli /
Knowledge which is divorced from 
justice, may be called cunning rather
than wisdom. 
/ Cicero /
middle-aged. There is not a single MP who
has paid tuition fees. We have a large part of
the population with debts from these or who
face working well into old age because of
pension changes, but there is no person in
Parliament who shares, or will share, their
experience.”18
The absence of age diversity, Swinson sug-
gested, has an impact on the kinds of social
experiences represented. One may thus hope
that a more age-diverse parliament could
better account for the age and cohort-related
plurality of experiences. The virtue of shared
experience thus offers an important ground
for descriptive representation, as Mans-
bridge argues. One first argument for youth
quotas, therefore, is that more age-diverse
parliaments will be better able to represent
the range of concerns that constituents may
have. Youth quotas would introduce more
experiential diversity into deliberations.
Increasing the chance of more vigorous advo-
cacy on behalf of the young
We may also defend the introduction of
youth quotas on the ground that there is an
important risk that policies and debates will
be driven by misrepresentations if conducted
solely within some age groups and to the ex-
clusion of others. If an age group is absent
from the debates, its aspirations and prob-
lems may become distorted. French and
British youth policies, for instance, can be
said to have been driven, to a large extent,
on false representations and often unfair
prejudices.19 There is a tendency in the
media and amongst politicians alike to em-
phasise personal desert and render young
people responsible for their own situation.
Discourses on youth tend to revolve around
their alleged laziness, bad attitude, and
strong sense of entitlement.20 As the writers
of the Jilted Generation argue, there seems to
be a resurgence of a Victorian ideology that
sees laziness where there is poverty and dis-
advantage, and lack of personal commit-
ment where there are structural and systemic
issues: “More than anything we’re vulnera-
ble and yet the attitude of much of the soci-
ety towards us is that we’re lazy and
undeserving.”21 
The Intergenerational Foundation recently
published a report on the perception of
young people in European countries. The re-
sults are quite compelling and account for
the poor perception of younger people in the
UK: “British people in their 20s achieved
the lowest scores of any country in relation
to being viewed with respect. […] In terms
Intergenerational Justice Review
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of contempt, British people in their 20s
came first.”22 Because of these misrepresen-
tations, as Furlong and Cartmel argue,
“when issues emerge that have a core rele-
vance for young people, they are often tack-
led from a paternalistic and condescending
‘we know what’s best for you’ perspective.”
An example they put forward is unemploy-
ment policy: politicians “tend to focus not
so much on creating opportunities, but on
tackling a perceived skill deficit and moti-
vating young people who are presented as
feckless and even as ‘inadequate citizens’.”23
An example of the impact such misrepre-
sentations may have would be the denial of
a means-tested minimum income guarantee
to French citizens under 25 years old. Since
its introduction in 1988, the access to a min-
imum income guarantee in France has been
restricted to citizens over the age of 25 years
old. In 2009, the scheme was finally re-
formed to include young people under 25
years old, but with much more restrictive re-
quirements: to be entitled to benefits, they
must have already worked for at least two
full time years in the past three. As a result,
only a few thousand young persons have ac-
cess to a minimum income when they need
it, while over 20% of French youth live in
poverty. In fact, most arguments that were
provided were either infantilising or pater-
nalistic: young people do not deserve it, they
will be idle and lazy if they receive it, they
do not really need it and they should not be
given something for nothing.24 If young per-
sons had had a stronger voice, including
stronger representatives, when this age-based
discrimination25 pertained, it would possi-
bly have found more resistance. We may
hope that bringing more young persons into
parliaments can have the modest impact of
not leaving the misrepresentations unchal-
lenged. 
Youth quotas can thus have the second im-
portant benefit of increasing the chance of
“more vigorous advocacy” on behalf of the
young, for instance by speaking out against
misrepresentations of the young as lazy and
self-deserving. We may hope that the young
will be fiercer challengers of some misrepre-
sentations and can act as watchdogs for age-
based discriminations.
If representatives underestimate, at best, and
misrepresent as laziness, at worse, the chal-
lenges that young people are facing, then
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gument for quotas.15 It does not rely on too
substantive a conception of what youth in-
terests consist of. Some groups may have
common concerns but its members may in-
terpret them in different ways based on their
goals, values, party lines or social class. Quo-
tas can help in making sure that political
parties include those concerns, whatever
their responses may be. They may therefore
promote more complete deliberations in
parliaments on these issues. This seems par-
ticularly relevant when studies show that the
young do feel that politicians do not take
their concerns seriously. In a survey on
young people’s attitudes towards political
parties, for instance, Hen and Foard showed
that only 7% of 18 year olds thought that
political parties were interested in the same
issues that concern young people.16
Older MPs were once young too and can
thus relate to such concerns. However, they
are not young “now” and may thus miss
some cohort-related concerns. Indeed, there
is an important difference between period
effects on the one hand and age effects on
the other hand.17 The period effect desig-
nates the impact of an event at a given time:
for instance, the effects of a financial crisis
can be described as period effects. Arguably,
many people suffer its consequences, re-
gardless of their age. However, there are also
age effects, which designate the impact of
age and membership in a generation on
given outcomes. Poverty or unemployment
as a result of the same financial crisis will be
experienced very differently if experienced at
a young age or towards the end of one’s ca-
reer, for instance. For young people, youth
unemployment and poverty can lead to de-
pendency on one’s parents, including for
 accommodation and income. Youth unem-
ployment may also lead to the postpone-
ment of projects young people might value,
such as starting a family or buying a home.
In parliaments, younger MPs may thus pick
on specific problems relating to housing, ed-
ucation and unemployment in a different
way than older MPs would. The 28-year-old
MP Jo Swinson, in 2009, complained about
the lack of age diversity within the UK par-
liament: 
“There are a huge number of Oxbridge-ed-
ucated lawyers elected as MPs when they are
No man is good enough to govern
another man without that other’s
consent. 
/ Abraham Lincoln /
A young man idle, an old man needy. 
/ English proverb /
vide a sufficient basis for youth quotas in
parliaments on its own. This leads us to an-
other important argument in favour of
youth quotas. I will now show that, regard-
less of the impact that descriptive represen-
tation can have on the quality of
deliberations, youth quotas can also be de-
fended on symbolic grounds. 
Symbolic representation: promoting a
community of equals
The symbolic value of representation is, in
Philips’ account, one of four legitimate
grounds for a politics of presence. “If subse-
quent scrutiny established that an
under‐participation of women […] had no
observable consequences (an unlikely out-
come, but still in principle possible),” Philips
argues, “this would not significantly alter the
judgment that such inequality is undesir-
able.”27 The symbolic value of descriptive
representation is such that, even if there were
only little evidence that quotas affect the
substantive representation of the margin-
alised group’s interests, there would still be
independent reasons to advocate a politics
of presence. Jointly, the substantive and
symbolic arguments provide a good basis for
the introduction of youth quotas in parlia-
ment.
The demonstrative symbolic value of youth
quotas
In his 1986 Tanner lectures on the signifi-
cance of choice, Tim Scanlon distinguishes
three reasons why we have to value individ-
ual choice: choice has “predictive” value,
“demonstrative” value, and “symbolic”
value.28 If I order my own food at the restau-
rant, instead of letting someone else choose
for me, then the order is likely to match my
preferences better than it would otherwise.29
This way, choice has predictive value – in
many circumstances, the fact that I choose
for myself predicts that the results of my
choices will accurately match my prefer-
ences. However, Scanlon argues, the predic-
tive value of choice is relative and
conditional: I may not know much about
the cuisine in this given restaurant or I may
be drunk. In this case, someone else may be
better than I am at ordering the right thing
for me. This often justifies paternalistic poli-
cies. The predictive value of choice, however,
is not the only value of choice. In other
words, it may be valuable for me as a person
to choose for myself even if I am not the best
judge of what my own interest is. Indeed,
Scanlon argues, choice also has demonstra-
tive and symbolic value. 
Scanlon illustrates the demonstrative value
of choice by appealing to the following ex-
ample:30 when you buy a gift for someone,
the best way to make sure that they get what
they prefer is often to let them pick what
they want or to give them money. However,
getting them exactly what they prefer is
partly beside the point. Gift giving is an op-
portunity to demonstrate care, affection and
knowledge. Likewise, the symbolic value of
choice is unrelated to the predictive value.
In a situation where people are normally al-
lowed to make their own choices, Scanlon
argues, “I may value having a choice because
my not having it would reflect a judgement
on my own or someone else’s part that I fall
below the expected standard of compe-
tence.”31 In some circumstances, if I am not
allowed to make a choice, it may mean that
I am considered as “inferior”. This matters
all the more, Scanlon argues, if the members
of my group are systematically questioned in
their capacity to choose for themselves. The
demonstrative and symbolic values of choice
are both unrelated to the “predictive” value
of choice precisely because they are non-in-
strumental. Regardless of whether I may get
the results wrong, my choice may have
demonstrative and symbolic value. 
How do these distinctions relate to the sym-
bolic value of descriptive representation?
Scanlon is primarily concerned with indi-
vidual choices, not with the representation
of these choices by suitable people. There is
a big stretch between saying that my indi-
vidual choice matters for demonstrative and
symbolic reasons, on the one hand, and say-
ing that my being politically represented by
people who look like me has demonstrative
and symbolic value, on the other hand. In
fact, Scanlon’s discussion of the symbolic
value of choice already makes some claims
about groups, categories and norms. 
Scanlon is partly concerned that paternalis-
tic policies respect the multiple ways in
which choice matters: “even when people are
not able to decide what is best for them-
selves, part of what must be taken into con-
sideration is whether some particular groups
are ‘being held inferior in the argument for
legal regulation’.”32 
In many circumstances, group identity has
policies are likely to be inadequate. Norman
Daniels imagined a procedure, the pruden-
tial lifespan account, where planners are
placed behind a veil of ignorance, so that
they ignore their age. They are then asked to
distribute a given bundle of resources
throughout their lives so as to maximise
lifespan efficiency: “How should that life-
time expectation of enjoying a certain level
of primary social goods be distributed over
each stage of life so that lifetime well-being
is maximised?”26 The outcomes of this pro-
cedure tell us what investments and distri-
butions are fair, and eventually which
inequalities between age groups are accept-
able. As Daniels suggests, the best way to es-
tablish the requirements of justice between
age groups would be to appeal to a veiled
representative body, as this would preserve
impartiality and prevent age bias. In prac-
tice, it is of course impossible to reproduce
the age-neutrality of the prudent planners.
However, in non-ideal circumstances, it
seems that the least we can do is to make
sure that deliberative bodies do include rep-
resentatives from all age groups to limit the
risk of age bias. Drawing on previous dis-
cussions, we may therefore argue that, in
non-ideal circumstances, the “politics of
prudence” requires a “politics of presence”,
defined by Anne Philips as the need to in-
crease the political representation of disad-
vantaged groups through quotas. 
A certain kind of presence is no “guarantee”
as such of certain kinds of ideas being ex-
pressed and of certain policies being imple-
mented. I have started this discussion with
two limitations of descriptive representation:
we cannot over-essentialise the young and
assume that young MPs will be radically bet-
ter at promoting youth concerns; and even if
they do, it will not directly affect imbalances
in power at the voting level. The impact of
quotas on substantive representation is thus
potentially not as radical as one may hope.
This does not mean that youth quotas will
have no impact on intergenerational fair-
ness. As I have shown, there are several rea-
sons to believe that the introduction of
quotas will have a positive impact on delib-
erations. However, this limitation shows that




The only free people are those who
cultivate their own thoughts... and
strive without fear to do justice to
them.
/ Berthold Auerbach /
All the citizens of a state cannot 
be equally powerful, but they may 
be equally free. 
/ Voltaire /
a meaning for whether given individuals are
acknowledged as equals or not. In this way,
descriptive representation may be considered
as contributing to the self-image of margin-
alised groups. If there are no women in par-
liaments, this has negative value for women’s
self-image as political equals. If there are
women in parliaments, this has positive
demonstrative value for women’s self-image.
Scanlon’s two non-instrumental concepts
thus seem to work together in the case of de-
scriptive representation. I will thus keep the
distinction between predictive value on the
one hand and symbolic and demonstrative
values on the other hand, but collapse the
two latter non-instrumental values into
one.33 Descriptive quotas may thus be said
to have what I henceforth refer to as
“demonstrative symbolic” value – they attest
that the relevant groups are political equals,
regardless of their potential substantive con-
tributions to parliamentary deliberations. 
Robert Goodin draws a parallel distinction
between self-interests and self-image. Irre-
spective of the substantive impact quotas can
have for the representation of the interests
of marginalised groups, political representa-
tion matters for self-image as well: “people's
self-images are, at least in places and in part,
tied up with politics.”34 Goodin highlights
this distinction between self-interest and
self-image to contradict studies that quotas
have no value if they have no impact on sub-
stantive representation. Against social scien-
tists who object to quotas on the ground of
its having little impact on the substantive
representation of the group’s interests,
Goodin argues that demonstrating the in-
applicability of one argument (self-interest)
does not dismiss the other (self-image).35
Similarly, Anne Philips emphasises the im-
portance of the composition of parliaments
for attesting the political equality of
women.36 Some men may be better at ad-
vancing the cause of women than some
women will, for ideological reasons. But this
is unlikely to exhaust our reasons for think-
ing that the absence of women in parlia-
ments is a problem for political equality. We
need women in parliaments regardless of
whether they will advance the cause of
women. We need ethnic minorities regard-
less of whether they will in fact have a con-
crete positive impact on anti-racism. 
We hope that it will be the case and this
gives us extra reasons for implementing quo-
tas in general, but the justification based on
the politics of ideas is not the only reason.
Diversity of geographical origins, ethnic
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backgrounds, genders, sexual orientations,
and occupation likewise have an important
symbolic value. As Mansbridge argues, de-
scriptive representation is likely to play a key
role in creating “a social meaning of ability
to rule” for groups that are not considered
as fit for politics.37 
Drawing on this demonstrative symbolic
value of quotas, one may argue that youth
quotas would consist in a “public acknowl-
edgment of equal value”,38 to borrow
Charles Taylor’s expression. It would signal
to society and young people that their con-
tribution is valued and that they are consid-
ered with equal respect. Their status of equal
citizens would be attested, recognised and
emphasised. The absence of young people in
parliaments, on the contrary, may signal the
opposite and creates a social meaning of in-
ability to rule. 
It may contribute to an apolitical self-image
of young adults and generate a sense that the
young are of lower social, or at least political,
status, and reinforce the sense that older
people are more fit to rule. 
If we care about the goal of a community of
equals, in which people relate to each other
as equals throughout their adult life, and re-
gardless of their age, then the existence of
such social meaning of political inferiority is
problematic and must be undermined. Rep-
resentation is significant symbolically be-
cause it attests political equality. Youth
quotas could thus participate in a redefini-
tion of young adulthood. They could con-
tribute to the construction of a social
understanding of the young as able to rule
and reinforce their image of equal citizens.
Gender and ethnic quotas contribute to un-
dermining the view that only white men are
able to be in parliaments. Youth quotas have
the potential to undermine the age norm
that young citizens under 30 years old, or in
some countries people under the age of 40,
are not fit to rule and thus contribute to the
political equalisation of young people. 
Like Philips, Mansbridge does not consider
the case of young people. She only mentions
young people as needing “role models” as di-
verse as possible in positions of authority, in-
cluding parliaments.39 Goodin, however,
elaborates his argument about the impor-
tance of self-image in the context of the
1972 Democratic National Convention,
where quotas had been introduced for
women, blacks and also for young people in
each state legislature. Quotas were intro-
duced to remediate the critical underrepre-
sentation of all three groups in previous
Conventions. In the context of the Vietnam
War, the absence of young people was con-
sidered all the more concerning in that their
age group was disproportionately affected by
the war. The idea that the young would not
be included as part of the political delibera-
tors and did not enjoy an equal status of au-
thority thus exacerbated the perceived
generational tension. The value of quotas
could thus be expressed partly in this sym-
bolic demonstrative vein of symbolically at-
testing the political equality of marginalised
groups. Legislative bodies, as figures of po-
litical authority and power, are particularly
suitable contexts for the symbolic demon-
stration of political equality. 
In this section, I claimed that descriptive
representation in general, and youth quotas
in particular, can be said to hold “demon-
strative symbolic value”. The introduction of
youth quotas would explicitly attest young
people’s political equality thus contributing
to a “social meaning of ability to rule”. 
The symbolic instrumental value of youth 
quotas
The presence of descriptive representatives,
as Mansbridge argues, is likely to have some
positive effects on the feelings of inclusion
of politically marginalised groups. “From
this perspective, if the costs are not too great,
we should promote diversity in positions of
authority and excellence.”40 Age diversity
may be an important kind of diversity, espe-
cially if some age groups, like the young, but
maybe the very old as well, are politically
marginalised. More age diversity in parlia-
ment may be particularly instrumental in
bringing about a more cohesive society, e.g.
where no one feels set aside. 
Youth quotas could thus indirectly play a
role in encouraging young people to vote,
for instance. As Shiv Malik argues, it would
be too simplistic to believe that young peo-
ple plainly do not want to engage to explain
the fact that their voting turnout is so low: 
“When, before the 2005 general election,
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How people keep correcting us when
we are young! There is always some
bad habit or other they tell us we
ought to get over. Yet most bad
 habits are tools to help us through
life.
/ Friedrich Nietzsche /
The arrogance of age must submit 
to be taught by youth. 
/ Edmund Burke /
45
the Electoral Commission launched a cam-
paign to persuade young people to vote with
the shout-line: ‘If you don’t do
politics…there’s not much you do do’, they
missed the point entirely. It’s not that young
people don’t do politics, it’s that modern
politics doesn’t do young people.”41
We may hope that quotas contribute to in-
creasing young voters’ turnout. To reply to
Shiv Malik’s quote, one may hope that
youth quotas may send the following ex-
plicit message: “Politics does young people
now.” The presence of some young people in
parliaments may thus act as a strong sym-
bolic gesture to reengage young people in
political communities, potentially impact-
ing their voting turnouts.
Youth quotas also have the potential to in-
crease the vertical communication between
constituents and their MPs. Increased diver-
sity amongst MPs, Mansbridge argues, can
have an impact on people being more likely
to visit their MPs if they feel more experien-
tial closeness to them.42 She draws on stud-
ies that suggest that black people in the US
are more likely to go see their Congressper-
son if they, too, are black. Age membership
is very different from other identities, but
one could speculate that older people may
feel more confident in sharing their concerns
with an MP from their generation. Similarly,
we can imagine cases in which young people
may feel more comfortable communicating
their concerns to representatives roughly
their age instead of people the age of their
parents or grandparents. They may fear, for
instance, paternalistic or contemptuous re-
sponses.
There only need to be a few young MPs for
this to work. Mansbridge argues that one of
the advantages of descriptive representation
is that it can allow communication beyond
formal constituencies.43 Women representa-
tives may act as surrogate representatives for
women who share their views across various
constituencies. So the vertical communica-
tion may be improved, through an increased
communication between populations and
surrogate descriptive representatives, even if
they are not their representatives. This way,
age diversity could contribute to enhancing
the vertical communication between con-
roundly criticised by young people in Ger-
many. 
13 Van Parijs 1995: 298.
14 Berry 2012: 13.
15 See Philips 1995: 27-57.
16 See Hen and Foard in Berry 2012: 40.
17 See Chauvel 1998: 286-289.
18 See Swinson in Parkinson 2009.
19 See Buckingham 2012; Howker and
Malik 2010; Intergenerational Foundation
2012.
20 See Jones 2011.
21 Howker and Malik 2010: 69.
22 See Leach 2011.
23 Furlong and Cartmel in Berry 2012: 16.
24 See Bidadanure 2012.
25 The first version of the scheme, which
completely excluded young people under 25
years old, was considered an illegitimate dis-
crimination by the French Equal Opportu-
nities and Anti-Discrimination Commission
(Haute Autorité de Lutte Contre les Dis-
criminations 2008, 8-10). 
26 Daniels 1988: 62.
27 Philips 1995: 33.
28 See Scanlon 1986: 177-185.
29 See Scanlon 1986: 177-179.
30 Scanlon 1986: 179.
31 Scanlon 1986: 180.
32 Scanlon 1986: 181.
33 See Scanlon 1986: 180-181.
34 Goodin 1977: 259.
35 See Goodin 1977: 260.
36 See Philips 1995: 27-57.
37 See Mansbridge 1999: 648-650.
38 Taylor in Philips 1995: 40.
39 See Mansbridge 1999: 651.
40 Mansbridge 1999: 651.
41 Howker and Malik 2010: 154.
42 See Mansbridge 1999: 641-643.
43 See Mansbridge 1999: 642.
44 Note that this is potentially also a point
that falls into the substantive representation
argument. If there is a better vertical com-
munication as a result of youth quotas, this
is also likely to improve the substantive rep-
resentation of youth concerns in parlia-
ments. In fact, Mansbridge classifies
enhanced vertical communication under the
category of substantive representation
(Mansbridge 1999, 641-643).
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